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Meinard Kuhlmann, Holger Lyre, and Andrew Wayne (eds.), Ontological
Aspects of Quantum Field Theory. Singapore: World Scientific (2002), 376
pp., $98.00 (cloth).
What does quantum field theory (QFT) tell us about the furniture of
the world? Seventeen essays gathered in the four parts of Ontological
Aspects of Quantum Field Theory address this question from different
angles and with different objectives. Together, they form a wide-ranging
and up-to-date volume that makes a valuable contribution to an ongoing
discussion, which, due to the comprehensive introduction by the editors,
can be of interest to experts and novices alike.
The essays in the first part, “Approaches to Ontology,” explore different
philosophical frameworks in which the ontology of QFT could be ex-
amined. Despite their differences, they all agree that traditional ontologies,
in particular substance-attribute ontologies, are unsuitable for QFT. Peter
Simons begins by pointing out why traditional ontologies are inadequate,
then putting forward his own suggestion: factored ontology, the main idea
of which is to posit basic features (‘factors’) and to view objects as suitable
combinations of these. He expresses confidence that this framework will
prove fruitful in the case of QFT, but does not make an attempt to
formulate a factor ontology of QFT.
Johanna Seibt begins with some methodological reflections on philo-
sophical ontology in general and then launches a sustained attack on
substance ontologies. As an alternative, she suggests the so-called ‘axi-
omatic process theory’, which denies that all concrete individuals are
particulars and postulates as basic entities so-called ‘free processes’. These
processes are concrete in the sense that they are spatiotemporally occur-
rent, but they are not particulars. Like Simons, Seibt merely puts forward
her framework as a suggestion, without presenting a worked-out ontology
of QFT.
In his comment on the former two essays, Meinard Kuhlmann com-
pares the two frameworks, drawing attention to problems they face. The
main problem with Seibt’s account, he argues, is the lack of a satisfactory
characterization of free processes, which leaves us in dark about what
they really are. He then criticizes Simons’ account as being too lavish and
questions whether it can help us understand the ontology of QFT, given
that its categories have no connection whatsoever to the formalism (or
any other aspect) of QFT.
Sunny Auyang takes the question of how field theories refer to entities
in the world as her starting point. She distinguishes between direct ref-
erence and reference by description, pointing out that the former presup-
poses an ontology of individual entities with numerical identity, while the
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latter works against the background of bundles of qualities. Interestingly,
both types of reference occur in QFT, from which she draws the conclusion
that the ontology of QFT is much more complex than one might think.
The second part of the book, “Field Ontologies for QFT,” is dedicated
to a discussion of Paul Teller’s suggestion that the basic entities of QFT
are quanta, which, unlike classical particles, lack ‘primitive thisness’. In
the course of his discussion, Teller also dismisses an understanding of
QFT that takes field configurations to be represented by field operators.
Andrew Wayne aims at resisting this judgement and argues that, suitably
developed, this way of thinking about quantum fields can provide a val-
uable basis for an interpretation of QFT. He does not provide a worked-
out interpretation, but instead presents some preliminary results in this
direction that center around the notion of vacuum expectation values.
Gordon Fleming agrees with Teller’s characterization of quantum par-
ticles, but he does not believe that this provides a sufficient reason for
the move from the labeled tensor product formalism to a Fock space
formulation, because it is not true that the excess formal structure comes
at the high ontological costs that Teller maintains. Regarding Teller’s
claims about quantum fields, Fleming by and large agrees with Wayne
that the operator-valued quantum field is in closer correspondence to the
classical field than Teller admits.
Teller replies to these criticisms by articulating two further differences
between classical and quantum fields. First, unlike in classical physics
where field configurations are contingent in that alternative sets of field
values are possible, in the quantum context the actual configuration is
necessary and no alternatives are possible. Second, classical fields, ac-
cording to Teller, are causal agents in that they produce observable phe-
nomena, while operator-valued quantum fields do no more than specify
the structure of physically possible occurrences.
The third part of the book, “Relativity, Measurement, and Renor-
malization,” begins with Jeffrey Barrett’s contribution, which points out
that there is a close connection between proposed solutions to the mea-
surement problem and one’s ontological commitments. This is bad news,
because solving the measurement problem in relativistic quantum field
theory (RQFT) is even more difficult than in nonrelativistic theories, due
to additional relativistic constraints and Malament’s theorem. (Roughly:
Given certain plausible assumptions, there cannot be any detectable ob-
jects of finite size.)
Hans Halvorson and Rob Clifton defend Malament’s theorem against
criticisms by proving two no-go theorems, showing that no assumptions
about the nonexistence of preferred reference frames and about precise
localization are needed to sustain the point against localizable particles.
However, to establish that a field, rather than a particle, ontology is
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appropriate to RQFTs, a further step is needed. They formulate necessary
conditions for a RQFT to permit a particle interpretation and then show
that no RQFT can satisfy these.
Dennis Dieks points out that it is difficult to accommodate the no-
tion of a localized event in algebraic relativistic quantum field theory
(ARQFT). This problem can be solved by adopting an interpretation of
the theory based on ideas of the modal interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. As a result, a system’s properties are only defined with respect
to a frame of reference. Supplementing this with a basic decoherence
condition, we find that definite physical magnitudes can be associated
with each space time region, which are the localized events we were looking
for.
Brigitte Falkenburg approaches the ontology of QFT from a Kantian
point of view, which regards all properties as relational and denies that
there are any intrinsic properties. Falkenburg extends this view to QFT,
arguing that quantum fields have no reality ‘on their own’ and only exist
as ‘strongly coupled’ entities.
Nick Huggett raises the question of whether QFT can be a possible
candidate for a true theory. Prima facie, the fact that full-fledged QFT is
intractable and has to be supplemented with perturbative methods and
renormalization techniques seems to be grist for the instrumentalist’s mill.
Huggett argues that this impression is wrong. Based on a detailed analysis
of how renormalization proceeds, he claims that we can be realists about
QFT, because the physics of the full-fledged theory is well-captured by
perturbative renormalization.
At the beginning of the fourth part, “Gauge Symmetries and the Vac-
uum,” Michael Redhead observes that physical theories often contain
surplus structure, i.e., mathematical elements that lack a direct link to
reality. Gauge transformations are transformations that only act nontri-
vially on these parts of a theory. Given this, how can gauge symmetries
provide interesting information about the physical world? There are three
answers to this question: First, one can move gauge potentials across the
boundary of the surplus structure and interpret them realistically. Second,
one can reformulate the theory in terms of gauge-invariant quantities,
which renders it nonlocal. Third, and this is the answer that Redhead
favors, one can allow for yet more surplus structure, such as ghost fields,
antifields, and so on. This admittedly has the disadvantage of leaving us
with the puzzle of how to clarify the nature of these objects, which is,
according to Redhead, the most pressing problem in current philosophy
of physics.
Michael Drieschner, Tim Oliver Eynck, and Holger Lyre do not agree
with Redhead’s assessment and defend his second option. They point out
that all three options have nonlocal features; therefore, this does not count
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against the second option. They then formulate an account of what they
call ‘prepotentials’ (nonseparable equivalence classes of gauge potentials
in the entire space), point out that these are equivalent to the loop integrals
used in the second approach, and suggest that these are the basic entities
of gauge field theories.
Simon Saunders asks whether the so-called ‘zero-point energy’ is real.
He first puts this question into the context of the cosmological constant
problem and then approaches it from a historical perspective by discussing
the classical ether, Dirac’s negative energy sea, and the Casimir effect. A
discussion of zero-point fluctuations then leads him to conclude the zero-
point energy should not be considered as both real and unreasonably
large. He then suggests regarding the cancellation of the zero-point energy
by the cosmological constant as a renormalization of the expectation value
of the energy-stress tensor. This suggestion, if correct, would lend further
support to the above conclusion.
Miklos Re´dei points out that one of the noteworthy features of algebraic
quantum field theory (AQFT) is its ontological silence: the axioms of the
theory do not mention fields or particles at all. But this does not imply
ontological neutrality. First, while AQFT is hospitable to field ontologies,
it is incompatible with an ontology based on localized particles. Second,
AQFT can accommodate the principle of the common cause, but it is still
an open question whether there actually are such common causes.
The essays collected in this book do not present a definite and unan-
imous answer to the question of ‘what there is’ according to QFT, but as
they are a valuable contribution to the philosophical discussion of QFT,
they will be a reference point for future work in this field.
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Robert P. Farrell, Feyerabend and Scientific Values: Tightrope-Walking
Rationality. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (2003), 260 pp.,
$86.00 (cloth).
There is a popular misconception of Feyerabend’s later philosophy
according to which Feyerabend dropped rationality as the explanation of
scientific advance, arguing that science’s development is primarily guided
by power, propaganda, and prejudice. Farrell exposes this error. He pin-
points Feyerabend’s core insight that any complete set of methodological
rules will necessarily be inconsistent. However, this does not make Fey-
erabend an irrationalist. Feyerabend’s later philosophy can be recon-
structed into a form of values-based rationalism: To be rational is to
balance incompatible methodological demands.
